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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuit was established in part to review the decisions
of the Federal District Courts and the Patent Appeals Board
regarding issues of patent law. Some believe that the goal of
Congress was to develop consistency in the decisions and inject the
insight of patent practitioners into interpretations of patent law.
Twenty years into its existence, the success of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in achieving Congress’ goals is unclear. What
is clear, however, is the profound influence the Federal Circuit’s
decisions have had on patent law and, in turn, on the business and
technology sector.
This Article reviews the court’s decisions in a snapshot of time.
Many of these decisions have been superceded by later cases and
decisions by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, they are instructive to
understand the operation of the Federal Circuit.
I.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT PRACTICE

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Federal courts require subject matter jurisdiction over a claim
before adjudicating the case.1 Congress limits the subject matter
jurisdiction of federal courts by requiring either a federal question,
including patent jurisdiction, or diversity between the parties.2
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”).
2. See id. § 1332(a) (listing various grounds for federal diversity jurisdiction).
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Alternatively, when a case involves both a federal question and a state
law cause of action, federal courts may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction to address both claims.3 Since 1982, the Federal Circuit
has exercised exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all patent appeals.4
In Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co.,5 the Federal Circuit agreed with
the Fifth Circuit affirmation of the district court’s denial of
appellant’s motion to remand to Texas state court.6 The Fifth Circuit
transferred the appeal to the Federal Circuit honoring its exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals arising under the patent laws.7 The Federal
Circuit decided that appellant’s state law contract claim implicating a
patent license gives rise to a substantial question of patent law;
namely, whether the accused activity infringes the underlying patent
contemplated in the license.8
The Federal Circuit in Connaught Laboratories, Inc. v. SmithKline
Beecham P.L.C.9 dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction an appeal
filed by the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
based on its unsuccessful motion to quash third-party subpoenas
requiring testimony from its employees.10 The Federal Circuit
explained that its appellate jurisdiction excludes the review of district
court discovery orders. “[The] nonappealability of orders requiring
the production of evidence from witnesses has long been established”
and applies both to discovery orders on parties as well as nonparties.11
3. See id. § 1367 (“[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over
all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution.”).
4. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25;
see also Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1431, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1074, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (declaring that under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, the Federal
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals from the district courts).
5. 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion).
6. See id. at 1464 (affirming that plaintiff’s contract claim turned on the
resolution of a patent law question, giving the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over the
appeal).
7. See id. at 1463 (acknowledging the Fifth Circuit was correct in determining
that appellant’s claim included allegations that patent laws were violated).
8. See id. at 1464 (noting appellant claimed a violation of the contract because
Halliburton purchased a company that violated a valid patent owned by appellant).
9. 165 F.3d 1368, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
10. See id. at 1369, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541 (describing facts in which
SmithKline served subpoenas on three FDA employees to elicit their testimony and
filed a motion to compel compliance with the subpoenas). The Federal Circuit held
in part that because only final decisions of district courts may be considered, a nonfinal court order to compel must be dismissed. See id. (relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
which limits jurisdiction “to review of final decisions of district courts”) (citation
omitted).
11. Id. at 1369-70, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541 (quoting Micro Motion, Inc. v.
Exac Corp., 876 F.2d 1574, 1575-76, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1070, 1072 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (citation omitted)).
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In dicta, the court ruminated that parties and nonparties alike “may
secure review of a discovery order by refusing to comply with it and
appealing a consequent contempt order, which is considered final.”12
In DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc.,13 the
Federal Circuit expanded its appellate jurisdiction to include
nonfrivolous counterclaims raising patent issues.14 Previously, the
court held that it had appellate jurisdiction over cases raising
nonfrivolous compulsory counterclaims of patent infringement.15 For
purposes of its jurisdictional mandate, however, the court found no
difference between compulsory and permissive patent counterclaims,
giving it proper appellate jurisdiction of this copyright infringement
case.16
In In re Cambridge Biotech Corp.,17 the Federal Circuit exercised
appellate jurisdiction over a district court’s review of a bankruptcy
court decision.18
The court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
resolution of a patent cross-license agreement because the
bankruptcy constituted the core proceeding.19 However, the raising
of patent infringement claims during a bankruptcy proceeding gives
rise to sufficient grounds for Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction.20
In Puerta v. California Institute of Technology,21 the Federal Circuit
agreed with the district court’s determination that 28 U.S.C.
12. Id. at 1370, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1541 (citing Micro Motion, 876 F.2d at
1577-78).
13. 170 F.3d 1354, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
14. See id. at 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004 (concluding that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1) gives the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal from final
judgment of a district court if the jurisdiction was based in whole or in part on 28
U.S.C. § 1338).
15. See id. (citing Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, 895 F.2d 736, 739-45,
13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670, 1672-78 (Fed. Cir. 1990)) (noting that Congress
intended for § 1295(a)(1) to guarantee uniformity for all non-frivolous patent law
claims).
16. See id. (stating that the plain language of section 1295(a)(1) and the intent of
the statute to guarantee uniformity in patent law appeals gives the Federal Circuit
appellate authority over non-frivolous claims of patent infringement).
17. 186 F.3d 1356, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
18. See id. at 1369, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (relying on Christianson v. Colt
Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1113 (1998),
which defines § 1338(a) as expanding the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over cases in
which patent law creates the cause of action or when the resolution of a patent law
question must take place in order to grant relief).
19. See id. at 1371, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331 (noting that the filing of a proof
of claim is a core proceeding of bankruptcy, irrespective of the patent infringement
claim).
20. See id. at 1370, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (determining that appellant’s
complaint and the district court’s decision were based on 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which
triggers appellate authority for the Federal Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)).
21. No. 99-1282, 1999 WL 592007 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).

MACKROGIANNISJCI.DOC

2000]

6/19/2001 10:53 AM

1999 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

1385

§ 1498(a) provides the Court of Federal Claims with exclusive
jurisdiction over patent infringement claims against alleged
infringing work performed “for the government.”22 The court
recognized that such was the case even though 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
gives district courts exclusive original jurisdiction over patent
infringement claims.23 The court went on to find that to avoid such
Federal Claim jurisdiction, a party must clearly show the work was not
done expressly for the government.24
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction allows federal courts to exercise their power
over particular parties, based on the party’s relationship to the forum
state.25 Patent suits present interesting issues of personal jurisdiction
as a result of the national enforcement of patents and the
international manufacturers that supply products to the United
States.
In Precor Inc. v. Keys Fitness Products,26 the Federal Circuit applied the
Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz27 to a Taiwanese corporation.28 The court stressed that a
foreign corporation cannot evade personal jurisdiction solely because
of its status as a foreign entity forced to defend itself in an
inconvenient United States forum.29 Instead, a foreign defendant
must present a “compelling” case that the district court’s exercise of
personal jurisdiction is “unreasonable” as a result of a balancing test.30
22. Id. at *1 (ruling that work performed under contract with NASA was work
performed “for the government” under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)).
23. See id. (dismissing plaintiff’s contention because 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) gives the
Federal Claims Court exclusive jurisdiction when it is alleged that the federal
government infringed a patent).
24. See id. at *2 (finding evidence showing that contract funds were used even
though work on project was terminated).
25. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
(holding that, among other factors, personal conduct and connection with the
forum state determine which court has personal jurisdiction over a case).
26. No. 98-1408, 1999 WL 55298 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 5, 1999) (unpublished opinion).
27. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
28. See Precor, 1999 WL 55298, at *3 (holding that the particular conditions from
Burger King apply to a foreign company as long as the company’s activities were
targeted at the residents of the forum state and the litigation results from alleged
injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities).
29. See id. at *4 (distinguishing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102, 114 (1987), and finding no per se rule that it is unduly burdensome for a
foreign corporation to defend itself in federal court).
30. Id. at *3 (noting that the Washington District Court had been asked to decide
whether a Taiwanese corporation that had allegedly sold its products through
distributors in Washington to Washington customers had infringed a U.S. patent
exclusively licensed by a corporation principally operating in Washington) (citing
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).
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The test factors include balancing the burden on the foreign
company to defend in the U.S. forum (i.e., small company, lack of
financial resources, or no experience in dealing with the U.S. legal
system) with the forum state’s interests in adjudicating the dispute.31
Such interests include providing efficient resolution of controversies,
furthering “fundamental substantive policies,” and the plaintiff’s
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief.32
In Schwanger v. Munchkin, Inc.,33 the Federal Circuit reversed a
district court’s decision to apply Sixth Circuit law to determine the
existence of personal jurisdiction.34 The court mandated that the
district court use the Federal Circuit’s three-part test for personal
jurisdiction in patent cases.35 Under this test, personal jurisdiction
satisfies due process when the defendant purposefully directs its
activities to the forum, the claim arises out of or relates to those
activities, and jurisdiction over the company is reasonable and fair.36
However, when a state law claim comes before the Federal Circuit, as
in Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc.,37 and the state law claim is
not intimately tied to the enforcement of a substantive patent right,
the district court need not apply the Federal Circuit’s test for
personal jurisdiction.38
C. Standing
Article III of the Constitution39 limits federal courts to adjudicate
only actual cases40 or controversies.41 Federal courts have created the
31. See id.
32. Id. at *3 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
33. No. 99-1049, 1999 WL 820449 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 7, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
34. See id. at *2 (concluding that the Federal Circuit may not defer to the
interpretations of other regional federal and state courts in patent cases when using
federal constitutional analysis to determine jurisdiction) (citing Beverly Hills Fan Co.
v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1564-65, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006
(Fed. Cir. 1994)).
35. See id. at *3 (disagreeing with the district court’s interpretation of the Ohio
statute as applied to the Federal Circuit personal jurisdiction test).
36. See id. at *5 (articulating a test that protects the rights of the defendant from
being unfairly forced to try a case in the forum chosen by the plaintiff) (citation
omitted).
37. 172 F.3d 852, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
38. See id. at 857, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307 (recognizing that established
personal jurisdiction standards in patent law cases should not apply to cases in which
a patent law issue does not exist).
39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . .
[and] to Controversies . . . . ”); see, e.g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1974)
(noting that the ability of courts to exercise power under Article III “depends on the
existence of a case or controversy”).
40. See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 566 (1944) (determining that a case must
refer to a question regarding the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States
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standing doctrine to ensure that such a case or controversy exists
between the parties in the lawsuit.42 Standing requires evidence of
injury, causation, and redressability.43 The standing doctrine also
requires that issues before the court are ripe44 and not moot.45 The
Federal Circuit reviews issues of standing de novo.46
In Amana Refrigeration,47 the Federal Circuit held a declaratory
judgment action on patent invalidity as moot where the parties had
put into place a covenant not to sue.48 The court found no actual
controversy regarding the patent’s validity in light of defendant’s
covenant not to assert patent infringement.49 The parties entered
into the covenant after the suit was filed; even so, the declaratory
judgment action was not ripe to consider a possible controversy over

based on current as opposed to future rights and to an actual controversy over an
issue).
41. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1936) (requiring that a
controversy “must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree of conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts”) (citations omitted).
42. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1991) (describing
standing as an essential component to the case or controversy requirement of Article
III of the Constitution); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1989) (stating the
doctrine of standing is used to determine whether a dispute should be decided
through the judicial process).
43. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (“The irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in
fact’ . . . . Second, there must be a causal connection between injury and conduct
complained of . . . . Third, it must be likely . . . that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.”).
44. See North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (noting that ripeness
under Article III requires that a case involve a real controversy seeking specific relief
through an actual law, as opposed to an abstract debate over what the law should
be); see also Hinrichs v. Whitburn, 975 F.2d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating
“[c]ases are unripe when the parties point only to hypothetical, speculative, or
illusory disputes as opposed to actual, concrete conflicts”).
45. See Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990) (stating that
courts cannot exercise jurisdiction when awarding relief would be moot since the
controversy would no longer be live or ongoing); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 496 (1969) (observing that mootness occurs when issues are no longer live or
when parties lack an interest in the outcome); see also United States v. Shenberg, 90
F.3d 438, 440 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that when subsequent events render issues
moot, federal courts no longer have Article III jurisdiction).
46. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1065, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (recognizing standing as a jurisdictional
requirement to be reviewed in the Federal Circuit de novo).
47. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 172 F.3d at 852, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1304.
48. See id. at 855, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306 (holding that by enacting a
covenant not to sue, Quadlux removed Amana’s reasonable apprehension of facing a
suit based on activities prior to the filing date and thus rendered the controversy
moot).
49. See id. (concluding that even though a controversy may have existed prior to
filing, the covenant ensured Quadlux was prevented from claiming liability against
Amana during the times in question, thus resolving the controversy).
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future products.50
In Mackay v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,51 the Federal
Circuit ruled that standing to bring an action against the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) under either the Federal Tort Claims
Act52 or the Administrative Procedure Act53 requires an exhaustion of
administrative remedies.54
Specifically, the PTO provides the
administrative remedy of filing a petition with the Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks to contest a particular office action.55 In this
case, the PTO failed to assign a priority date.56 Because the petitioner
failed to pursue this administrative remedy prior to filing a
complaint, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the claim.57
D. Clarification of Prior Decisions
In Scaltech v. Retec/Tetra, LLC,58 the Federal Circuit clarified its prior
decision of September 10, 1998 to conform with the Supreme Court
decision in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.59 The Pfaff decision set forth
an analysis for the on-sale bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).60 The
Federal Circuit interpreted the Pfaff analysis to require the district
court to determine whether the activities met each claim limitation,
and thus amounted to an embodiment of the claimed invention.61
Specifically, a process patent requires analysis of the process offered

50. See id. (rejecting Amana’s apprehension of being sued over new products as a
present controversy since future acts are too speculative to serve as a basis for
jurisdiction).
51. No. 99-1305, 1999 WL 955907 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
52. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-6780 (1994).
53. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).
54. See Mackay, 1999 WL 955907, at *1 (finding Mackay had no standing because
he failed to petition for a priority date and therefore had not exhausted his
administrative remedies).
55. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.530 (2000) (outlining the procedure required for a patent
owner to request reexamination by the PTO).
56. See Mackay, 1999 WL 955907, at *1.
57. See id. at *2 (stating “[b]ecause Mr. Mackay did not pursue administrative
remedies before filing his complaint in the district court, the district court has no
jurisdiction.”).
58. 178 F.3d 1378, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1999), modifying 156
F.3d 1193, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
59. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998).
60. See id. at 67 (holding that when a product is the subject of a commercial offer
for sale and the invention is ready for patenting, the invention is “on sale” within the
meaning of the statute and cannot be patented).
61. See Scaltech, 178 F.3d at 1383, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058-59 (requiring the
district court to determine whether the process offered for sale to Chevron and
Champlin would meet the claim limitations regarding particle size and solid
concentration in order to determine whether an embodiment of the claimed
invention was offered for sale).
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for sale in its normal use.62
E. Vacatur and Remand
The Federal Circuit in Novamax Technologies, Inc. v. Southern
Industrial Chemicals, Inc.63 vacated a district court judgment that sua
sponte dismissed the parties’ claims for both abuse of the judicial
process and waste of the court’s time.64 The court decided that a
district court cannot, without notice, punish parties so extremely in
order to effectuate a timely resolution of the litigation.65
In TransLogic Corp. v. Tele Engineering, Inc.,66 the Federal Circuit
ruled that the district court misunderstood its previous decision
regarding a motion on validity and therefore allowed the lower court
to grant a new trial on that issue.67 The court vacated the district
court’s ruling based on the earlier remand to rule on the motion for
a new trial in order to address the question of validity.68
F. Preemption
The preemption doctrine allows federal law to supplant state law in
areas where the Constitution allows and Congress decides to
legislate.69 In patent law, preemption comes into play when federal
and state laws encroach into the purview of patent statutes and case
law.70
62. See id. at 1384, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1059 (“[I]f the natural result flowing
from the operation of the process offered for sale would necessarily result in
achievement of each of the claim limitations, then the invention was offered for
sale.”).
63. Nos. 98-1285, 98-1410, 1999 WL 197207 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 1999)
(unpublished opinion).
64. See id. at *2 (stating the dismissal was an abuse of discretion since the parties
were given no warning that their behavior would be sanctioned so severely).
65. See id. (stating by failing to give parties a chance to modify their behavior, the
district court improperly disregarded the parties’ due process rights).
66. No. 98-1392, 1999 WL 282731 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
67. See id. at *1 (noting that the Federal Circuit improperly stated in the
clarifying order that a new trial had been previously denied based on the validity
issue because the district court in fact never addressed this particular motion).
68. See id. at *1-2 (realizing that although the district court granted TransLogic’s
motion for a new trial on the question of damages, it did not address the motion for
a new trial on the issue of validity).
69. See, e.g., California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987)
(describing three different ways that federal law can preempt state law, each of which
focuses on congressional intent).
70. See Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1358-59, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that the issue of preemption
is raised when “patent law preempts particular state law causes of action or conflicts
with rights created by other federal law”); see also Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes
Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574-75, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626, 1631 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (discussing the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over patent claims and non-
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In Midwest Industries, Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc.,71 the en banc
Federal Circuit overruled its previous decisions of Cable Electric
Products, Inc. v. Genmark, Inc.,72 and Harmonic Design, Inc. v. Hunter
Douglas, Inc.73 The court ruled that Federal Circuit precedent, as
opposed to that from regional circuits, would be used to resolve
conflicts between patent law and other federal and state laws.74
Specifically, the court stated:
In order to fulfill our obligation of promoting uniformity into the
field of patent law, it is equally important to apply our construction
of patent law to the questions whether and to what extent patent
law preempts or conflicts with other causes of action. Otherwise,
we will be forced into the awkward posture of holding that, with
respect to cases coming to us from district courts in some circuits,
patent law forecloses certain other causes of action, but with
respect to cases coming to us from district courts in other circuits,
75
it does not.

G. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for summary judgment
adjudication of issues before trial.76 The general standard for
summary judgment requires the lack of genuine issues of material
fact.77 If there is no genuine issue of material fact, the district court
may resolve the claim before presenting the evidence to a trier of
fact.78
patent issues arising from those claims).
71. 175 F.3d 1356, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
72. 770 F.2d 1015, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 881 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
73. 153 F.3d 1318, 417 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1143 (1999).
74. See Midwest Indus., 175 F.3d at 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 (holding
that Federal Circuit law should apply to all conflicts of law regarding patent issues
since the court was specifically created to promote uniformity in patent law).
75. Id. at 1360, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
76. See FED . R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may . . . move . . .
for a summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.”); see also
FED . R. CIV. P. 56(b) (applying rule similar to Rule 56(a) to defendants).
77. See FED . R. CIV. P. 56(c) (stating “if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact,” the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law); see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (noting summary judgment is
proper when a party fails to sufficiently prove an element essential to the case and
the burden of proof is on that party at trial); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.
242, 248-49 (1986) (defining a genuine issue as one that can only be resolved by the
trier of fact because it could be resolved in either party’s favor, and a material fact is
one that affects the outcome of the suit under the substantive law).
78. See FED . R. CIV. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note (1963 Amendment) (“The
very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and
assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.”).
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In Oney v. Ratliff,79 the Federal Circuit held that the summary
judgment standard on the issue of patent validity required a quantum
of clear and convincing evidence.80 The court decided that if a trier
of fact, applying the clear and convincing evidence standard, could
find for either party, summary judgment would be inappropriate.81
Specifically, uncorroborated oral testimony of close associates to show
prior use did not meet the clear or convincing standard necessary to
find summary judgment on validity.82
II. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
A. Patentable Subject Matter
The first hurdle an invention must cross is set out by 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, patentable subject matter.83 Not all inventions or discoveries
amount to patentable subject matter. The statute makes patentable
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter . . . .”84 This criteria had traditionally been the gate keeper
forbidding biotechnological, software, and business methods out of
the realm of patentable subject matter due to their existence in
nature or algorithmic nature.85

79. 182 F.3d 893, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1697 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
80. See id. at 895, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1699.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 896-97, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1700 (discussing whether the
conflict between the documentary evidence and the oral testimony of Ratliff
presented a genuine issue of material fact).
83. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (specifying which inventions or discoveries “may
obtain a patent . . . subject to the conditions and requirements of this title”); see also
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1600 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999)
(“‘The first door which must be opened on the difficult path to patentability is
§ 101 . . . .’” (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352, 360
(C.C.P.A. 1979))).
84. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
85. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding that under 35
U.S.C. § 101, a living organism may be patentable only if it is a “product of human
ingenuity”). See generally ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 38
(1994) (stating that “computer software and mathematical algorithms are not
eligible subject matter for patents”); see also State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1368. The State
Street Bank decision explicitly extended patent protection to business methods which
had been patentable in practice for many years. This decision has opened the flood
gates of business method patents related to the Internet and software related
solutions. Business methods in this context are a set of instructions to complete a
business goal such as e-commerce, banking, investment, or other modes of operation
within a particular business sector. Some examples of business method patents are
Amazon.com’s One-Click patent (U.S. Pat. No. 5,960,411) (issued Sept. 28, 1999),
and Priceline.com’s Reverse Auction patent (U.S. Pat. No. 5,794,207) (issued Aug.
11, 1998).
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In AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.,86 the Federal Circuit
affirmed its landmark decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc.87 to allow business methods into the
realm of patentable subject matter.88 The court held an invention
employing a mathematical algorithm patentable subject matter when
the algorithm is applied “to produce a useful, concrete, tangible
result.”89 Even though the patent holder asserted only method
claims, the court found that the lack of physical representations did
not disqualify the algorithm from patentable subject matter.90 The
Federal Circuit seems eager to conform with the changing needs of
computer-related inventions in our “modern world.”91
In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,92 the Federal Circuit held
that the utility requirement of patentable subject matter does not
exclude a product modified to imitate another product.93 The court
found that the ability to imitate a feature satisfies the utility
requirement.94 The court compared the imitation beverage dispenser
in this case to cubic zirconium, imitation gold leaf, synthetic fabrics,
and imitation leather, and patents for a method of putting imitation
grill marks on food, imitation wood floor laminate, and imitation
hamburger.95
In Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 96 the Federal Circuit
86. 172 F.3d 1352, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
87. 149 F.3d at 1377, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604 (finding that the
determination of patentable subject matter “should not turn on whether the claimed
subject matter does ‘business’ instead of something else”).
88. See AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1356, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450 (explaining
that the Federal Circuit dispensed with the “‘business method’ exception” in State
Street Bank when it noted: “[w]e take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived
exception to rest” (citing State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1602)).
89. Id. at 1358, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
90. See id. (“The notion of ‘physical transformation’ can be misunderstood . . . .
[I]t is not an invariable requirement, but merely one example of how a mathematical
algorithm may bring about a useful application.”).
91. See id. at 1356, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450 (“Since the process of
manipulation of numbers is a fundamental part of computer technology, we have
had to reexamine the rules that govern the patentability of such technology. The
sea-changes in both law and technology stand as a testament to the ability of law to
adapt to new and innovative concepts, while remaining true to basic principles.”).
92. 185 F.3d 1364, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1700 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
93. See id. at 1368, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703 (finding “no basis in section 101
to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply because
they have the capacity to fool some members of the public”).
94. See id. at 1367, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703 (asserting that the successful
imitation of a product can offer a “benefit sufficient to satisfy the statutory
requirement of utility”).
95. See id.
96. No. 99-1051, 1999 WL 693869 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 3, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
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categorized a “cinematic work” as printed matter and therefore not
patentable subject matter.97 The patent at issue involved animation
used to conform a character’s lip movements to dubbed-in dialog.98
The Federal Circuit did not find this quality sufficient to bridge
Section 101,99 and followed its earlier decision in In re Gulack,100
“[w]here the printed matter is not functionally related to the
substrate, the printed matter will not distinguish the invention from
the prior art in terms of patentability.”101
In Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp.,102 the Federal Circuit
considered the difference between lack of utility and enablement.103
The court decided that the two theories of invalidity are closely
related.104 Utility requires usefulness and operability in patentable
subject matter.105 While enablement requires adequate disclosure of
operability “to one skilled in the relevant art,”106 according to the
Federal Circuit, inoperable patents invalidated under utility
requirements also fail the enablement requirement.107
B. Novelty
The novelty requirement of the patent statute breaks down into
two categories: (1) loss of right based on the patent applicant’s prefiling behavior,108 and (2) anticipation based on prior art that already
97. See id. at *1 (agreeing with the district court that a cinematic work is
unpatentable under the printed matter doctrine).
98. See id.
99. See id. (finding the appellant does not adequately distinguish the ‘cinematic
work’ from unpatentable printed matter).
100. 703 F.2d 1381, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
101. See Bloomstein, 1999 WL 693869, at *1 (determining that printed matter may
be patentable where it is functionally related to the “article of manufacture” at issue
(quoting Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1385, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 404)).
102. 190 F.3d 1350, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
103. See id. at 1358-59, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034-35 (holding inoperative
subject matter is unpatentable under both the utility requirement and the
enablement requirement).
104. See id. (“Lack of enablement and absence of utility are closely related grounds
of unpatentability.”).
105. See id. at 1359, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035 (concluding that if the
description of the subject matter in the application is “nonsensical,” the subject
matter is not useful for purposes of patentability).
106. Id. at 1358, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1034.
107. See id. (“If a patent claim fails to meet the utility requirement because it is not
useful or operative, then it also fails to meet the how-to-use aspect of the enablement
requirement.”).
108. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (describing ways in which patentability can be lost,
including a patent applicant’s pre-filing behavior); see also Micro Magnetic Indus. v.
Advance Automatic Sales Co., 488 F.2d 771, 772, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 118, 120 (9th
Cir. 1973) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as preventing inventors from extending
their rights by exploiting their invention before applying for a patent through the
on-sale bar provision); Pickering v. Holman, 459 F.2d 403, 406-07, 173 U.S.P.Q.
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exists in the public domain or the inventive activities of others.109
1.

Statutory bar
The statutory bar requirement under Section 102(b) of the patent
statute prevents an inventor from obtaining a patent if the invention
was “on sale” or in public use in the United States more than one year
prior to the filing date of the patent application.110 The bar also
applies to inventions that were patented or described in a printed
publication anywhere more than one year before the filing date of
the application.111
In IGT v. Global Gaming Technology, Inc.,112 the Federal Circuit held
that the development of a fully operational prototype one year prior
to the patent’s filing date and under the terms of a contract for sale
triggers the on-sale bar.113 The court followed the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,114 ruling that an
invention not ready for patenting becomes so by the fact that it is
offered for sale one year prior to the filing date.115
In Datapoint Corp. v. PictureTel Corp.,116 the Federal Circuit held that
an argument asserting that a prototype device did not amount to a
commercial product that could be sold fails when the prototype is
shown to potential customers.117 In such a situation, patent law deems

(BNA) 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1972) (concluding that the on-sale bar set forth in 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) applies to any use that commercially exploits an invention whether it
be exposed to the public or hidden, and setting forth other types of pre-filing
behavior that may trigger the on-sale bar).
109. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (outlining how already prior art or innovations
by others can affect patentability); see also In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745, 49
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1949, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b), anticipation requires that every element of the proposed claim is found in
a piece of prior art either expressly or inherently); Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co.,
814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (reiterating the
principle that a patent will not be granted where each element of the proposed
invention can be shown in a single prior art reference).
110. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
111. See id.
112. No. 98-1246, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13336 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 1999), reh’g
denied, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19552 (Fed. Cir. July 26, 1999) (unpublished opinion).
113. See id. at *7-9 (explaining that the on-sale bar will apply where an invention is
offered for sale before it is fully developed as long as it is substantially complete prior
to the critical date).
114. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998).
115. See id. at 67-68, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646-47 (concluding that the “on-sale
bar applies” upon the satisfaction of two conditions one year prior to the filing date:
(1) the product is offered for commercial sale, and (2) the product is “ready for
patenting” either through a “reduction to practice” or “descriptions of the invention
sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the inventions”).
116. No. 98-1341, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 15786 (Fed. Cir. July 15, 1999)
(unpublished opinion).
117. See id. at *4-5 (refusing to overturn the trial court’s application of the on-sale
bar where evidence demonstrated that a prototype was shown to customers, thus
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that the applicant offered the prototype for sale and triggers the onsale bar under Section 102(b).118
In Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp.,119 the Federal Circuit
refused to find an exception to the on-sale bar for joint inventors
employed by the applicant and the potential customer.120 The court
found a commercial sale based on the distinct nature of the
corporations with no common ownership or control.121 The court
ignored any consideration of special circumstances because the
Supreme Court in Pfaff122 rejected the totality of the circumstances
test for a more definite standard to determine what triggers the onsale bar and starts the clock ticking for the applicant.123
In Comfort Silkie Co. v. Seifert,124 the Federal Circuit compared the
Supreme Court’s decision in Egbert v. Lippman,125 which found a
public use of a corset even though it was worn under clothes, to a
baby playing with a blanket, observable to others, in public
locations.126 The court held that clear and convincing evidence of
such a public use by the applicant more than a year before she filed
the patent application triggered the statutory bar under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b).127
In Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,128 the Federal
Circuit rejected an exception to the on-sale bar for accidental or
fraudulent sales of the invention by third parties.129 The court found
that when the applicant reduces the invention to practice, the
satisfying the requirement of a commercial offer for sale).
118. See id.; see also Trilogy Dev. Corp. v. Teknowledge Corp., No. C94-4222 MHP,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13095, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1996) (reasoning that where
a prototype is sufficiently developed, demonstrations may constitute an offer for sale,
triggering the on-sale bar provision in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
119. 182 F.3d 888, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
120. See id. at 890, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1472.
121. See id. (finding the buyer and seller involved in the sale were separate
corporations based on their having different owners and no common control).
122. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998).
123. See id. at 66 n.11, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646 n.11 (acknowledging that the
totality of the circumstances test is unnecessarily vague and thus should be rejected).
124. No. 98-1476, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16181 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 1999)
(unpublished opinion).
125. 104 U.S. 333 (1881).
126. See Comfort Silkie Co., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16181, at *4-5 (noting that if the
court believed wearing a corset under a person’s clothes was public use, it must find
that playing with a blanket in public is also a public use).
127. See id. (holding that use of a blanket in public places such as parks, airports,
and restaurants demonstrates that the inventor had no expectation of confidentiality,
and thus it was sufficient to constitute public use as set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
128. 182 F.3d 1315, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
129. See id. at 1319, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1310 (rationalizing that the purpose
of the on-sale bar is to prevent inventors from taking things out of the public domain
through commercialization, thus finding it irrelevant who offers the product for
sale).
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invention is ready for patenting regardless of whether the applicant
or the customer realizes all the aspects of the invention.130 The court
stated that “[i]f a product that is offered for sale inherently possesses
each of the limitations of the claims, then the invention is on sale,
whether or not the parties to the transaction recognize that the
product possesses the claimed characteristics.”131
2.

Anticipation
a. Inherency

The doctrine of inherent anticipation expands the scope of a prior
art reference to anticipate more than what is explicitly taught in that
prior art reference.132 Inherent anticipation thereby behaves like
obviousness when only one prior art reference provides all the
elements to anticipate a claim combined with the knowledge of one
skilled in the art.133
The Federal Circuit in In re Robertson134 held that mere
“probabilities or possibilities” cannot satisfy the requirements of
inherent anticipation.135
The court concluded that inherency
requires more than a showing that a skilled artisan would know to
combine the elements in the prior art reference.136 In another case
turning on inherency, MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v.

130. See id. (acknowledging that it is well-settled law that parties are not required
to know all of the relevant characteristics of their product when they offer it for sale).
131. Id. (citations omitted).
132. See Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1943, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding although it is usually necessary for a
prior art reference to show each limitation, it is possible that a prior art reference
may anticipate when the limitations are not expressly found in the prior art but are
inherently in it); see also In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 136, 138
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that inherency in prior art includes those structures in
the prior art that function similarly to those limitations of the structure to be
patented).
133. See Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1746, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that inherency can be evidenced by
extrinsic evidence that a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the
element in question as necessarily present); see also Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. SDL, Inc.,
103 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1206 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that in determining whether an
element is inherently disclosed, it is possible to look to whether a skilled artisan
would see the element as necessarily present).
134. 169 F.3d 743, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1949 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
135. See id. at 745, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950-51 (explaining it is not sufficient
in establishing inherency that something may result from a particular “set of
circumstances”; rather, there must be evidence that the missing element is necessary
to the prior art) (citations omitted).
136. See id. (asserting that in order to establish inherency, it is insufficient to show
that the combination of two elements of a prior art would be similar to an element of
the invention to be patented).
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Milgraum,137 the Federal Circuit required that the prior art reference
inherently teach the limitations and their relationship to each
other.138 Certain commonly known details, such as the hairiness of
guinea pigs, can be attributed to one skilled in the art once the prior
art reference makes explicit the relationship between the
limitations.139 Finally, in Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO Inc.,140 the Federal
Circuit held that a prior art reference that teaches the relationship
between the limitations even though it has not recognized the key
aspect of the applicant’s invention, may inherently anticipate the
patent-in-suit and thereby invalidate it.141
b.

Invention by another

The patent statute under Section 102(g)142 prohibits issuing a
patent when another inventor can show that the invention was made
in this country and was not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed.143
In determining priority of the inventions as between inventors, the
courts look to dates of conception and reduction to practice.144
Courts require corroborating evidence of each of these events.145
137. 192 F.3d 1362, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
138. See id. at 1365, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306 (holding that because the
instruction manual sold with a newly invented laser did not describe how the laser
should be aligned during use, it did not teach every limitation of the invention).
139. See id. at 1366, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306 (noting that the fact that a
person with ordinary skill following the manual would align the laser with the hair
follicle even though it does not specifically teach such alignment goes beyond mere
probabilities).
140. 190 F.3d 1342, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
141. See id. at 1348-49, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947 (reasoning that the mere fact
that the inventor of a prior art did not fully understand the inherent properties of
his invention does not mean that the party who discovers such pre-existing quality
should be granted patent rights because he has not discovered something novel).
142. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994) (outlining the novelty condition of patentability
and the loss of right to patent an invention).
143. See id. (stating that a person will not be entitled to a patent if the invention
existed previously and was not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed). See generally
Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277, 1280, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 388, 391 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (commenting that suppression and concealment mean withholding the idea
from the public and thereby preventing the public from benefiting from the idea).
144. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994) (establishing factors to consider in determining
the priority of inventions: dates of conception, reduction to practice, and reasonable
diligence of one “first to conceive and last to reduce to practice from a time prior to
conception by the other”). See generally Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (defining “conception” as the time
when the inventor has a definitive and permanent idea of a complete and
functioning invention which could be applied thereafter in practice, and “reduction
to practice” as constructive (when the patent application is filed) or actual (when the
invention works for its intended purpose)).
145. See, e.g., Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 857, 862
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (indicating that corroborating evidence showing that the inventor
told others his “completed thought expressed in such clear terms as to enable those
skilled in the art to make the invention” must be used to prove conception) (quoting
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In Thomson S.A. v. Quixote Corp.,146 the Federal Circuit noted that
corroborative evidence balances the interests of the patent applicant
against the self-interest of a testifying inventor.147 The court held that
corroboration of an inventor’s testimony was unnecessary unless the
inventor or her assignee is a named party asserting priority,148 or the
inventor stands to gain directly and substantially from a finding of
priority.149 The court left other situations where the level of selfinterest does not rise to this high a standard to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which empower the defendant with tools to impeach the
inventor.150
c.

Obviousness

The nonobviousness requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 103 depends
on four factors that the courts have formulated: (1) the “scope and
content” of teachings in the prior art;151 (2) the “differences between
the prior art and the claims. . .”;152 (3) the knowledge of one skilled in
Field v. Knowles, 183 F.2d 593, 601, 86 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 373, 379 (C.C.P.A. 1950));
Knorr v. Pearson, 671 F.2d 1368, 1373, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 196, 200 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(stating that corroborating evidence is necessary to establish an actual reduction to
practice).
146. 166 F.3d 1172, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1530 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S.
1036 (1999).
147. See id. at 1176, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1532-33 (commenting that the
corroboration rule is necessary only to protect the patentee from the self-interest of a
testifying inventor who may manipulate facts to produce a favorable outcome for the
inventor in a case determining the priority of inventions).
148. See id. (holding that the corroboration rule does not apply to testimony by
non-party inventors because often the interests of a non-party are not significant
enough).
149. See id. (asserting that corroborating evidence of a testifying inventor is
required when the inventor will profit from a decision rewarding priority to the
invention).
150. See id. (stating that the numerous methods in the Federal Rules of Evidence
and Rules of Civil Procedure by which a party may challenge or rebut oral testimony
as well as the clear and convincing standard of proof required to establish priority
usually protect a patentee from an erroneous finding of invalidity).
151. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467
(1966) (commenting that this factor and the additional three factors are factual
inquiries, although the ultimate question in determining the validity of a patent is
one of law); see also Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1568, 1
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1593, 1597 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting the legal standard to
determine the scope and content of prior art includes a consideration of the entire
prior patent; that is, the invention as a whole, including those parts of the prior
invention that differ from the invention in the suit). See generally Stratoflex, Inc. v.
Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1535, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 871, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(defining scope as anything “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with
which the inventor was involved”) (quoting In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036, 202
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 171, 174 (C.C.P.A. 1979)).
152. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467 (indicating that this
factor and the other factors help determine the “obviousness or nonobviousness of
the subject matter”); Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1566, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595
(asserting that the differences must be considered between the entire claimed
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the art;153 and (4) secondary “indicia of obviousness or
nonobviousness.”154 Such secondary indicia include commercial
success of the invention,155 satisfying a long-felt need,156 failure of
others to find a solution to the problem,157 and copying of the
invention by others.158 A prima facie case of obviousness requires that
invention and the entire prior art, and, furthermore, that facts providing what the
differences allowed the entire claimed invention to achieve may be considered as
well).
153. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467 (commenting that
while these factors provide the correct standard for the courts to apply, the PTO
holds the “primary responsibility” for excluding unpatentable material); see also
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1050, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1434,
1438 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that obviousness, a legal conclusion, requires a
preliminary determination of four factual inquiries including “the level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art”); Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1569, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598
(acknowledging that “level of skill” is a necessary inquiry in determining
obviousness).
154. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467 (indicating that the
secondary considerations may be used to show the background circumstances
regarding the origin of invention); see also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys.,
72 F.3d 1577, 1582, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that
secondary considerations provide evidence of nonobviousness); Panduit, 810 F.2d at
1569, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598 (referring to the secondary considerations as
objective evidence).
155. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467 (noting that evidence
of commercial success may be relevant to determine obviousness); see also In re
Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 140, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(asserting that the patent application must provide hard evidence of commercial
success to the PTO and that evidence of commercial success is relevant “only if there
is proof that the sales were a direct result of the unique characteristics of the claimed
invention—as opposed to other economic and commercial factors unrelated to the
quality of the potential subject matter;” thus, “a nexus is required between the sales
and the merits of the claimed invention”).
156. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 467 (providing that the
need must be long-felt, but unsolved); see also Richard L. Robbins, Subtests of
“Nonobviousness”: A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169,
1172 (1964) (“Existence of the defect creates a demand for its correction, and it is
reasonable to infer that the defect would not persist were the solution ‘obvious.’
This is the rationale of longfelt [sic] demand and its justification as a test of nonobviousness.”).
157. See id. at 35-36, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 474 (indicating that the failure of
others is a subtest of nonobviousness that focuses attention on “economic and
motivational rather than technical issues and [is] . . . more susceptible of judicial
treatment than are the highly technical facts often present in patent litigation”); see
also Stratoflex Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 871,
880 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that others skilled in the art must have tried to find a
solution and failed).
158. See Panduit, 810 F.2d at 1569, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598 (noting that
copying is an event that can be proved to have occurred, which is the reason the
court calls secondary indicia “objective” evidence); see, e.g., B.F. Goodrich, 72 F.3d at
1583, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318 (indicating that extensive development by
competitors and the ease or difficulty with which a non-infringing substitute can be
designed can provide evidence of copying by others); Huang, 100 F.3d at 139, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689 (stating that evidence of copying is relevant to a
nonobvious inquiry). See generally Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538-39, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
at 879 (discussing the importance of secondary considerations and noting that
evidence of secondary considerations “may often be the most probative and cogent
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there be a suggestion or motivation to combine the teachings of prior
art.159
In In re Newburger,160 the Federal Circuit found a reference from
another field relevant if one skilled in the art would reasonably have
sought guidance in that field to solve the problem which the inventor
overcame.161 Alternatively, the Federal Circuit, in Pfund v. United
States,162 agreed that in the same field there could be motivation to
combine up to seven references.163 The court stated that the lower
courts must, however, avoid using hindsight in making its obviousness
determination.164 Similarly, the lower courts must weigh secondary
indicia of nonobviousness, such as long-felt need and a governmentimposed secrecy order.165
In In re Dembiczak,166 the Federal Circuit found that the Board of
Patent Appeals had entered the forbidden territory of analyzing
obviousness based on hindsight.167 The court held that the Board did
not show suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the six prior

evidence”).
159. See In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 351, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1941, 1943-44 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (concluding that before the PTO “may combine the disclosures of two or
more prior art references in order to establish prima facie obviousness, there must be
some suggestion for doing so, found either in the references themselves or in the
knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art”); see also ACS Hosp.
Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 929, 933
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (asserting that without some teaching or suggestion to support the
combination, obviousness cannot be determined by combining the teachings of prior
art).
160. No. 98-1187, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 651 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 11, 1999)
(unpublished opinion).
161. See id. at *7.
162. No. 98-5097, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 733 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 1999)
(unpublished opinion).
163. See id. at *4 (upholding the Court of Federal Claims’ finding that there can
be motivation to combine prior art references).
164. See id. at *6-7 (commenting that a court must be aware of the dangers of
hindsight because analyzing the nonobviousness of a claim using hindsight may
render an invention obvious and simple to the decisionmaker, whereas at the time
the invention was made, the solution may have been ingenious and complex).
165. See id. at *7 (finding that because the Court of Federal Claims considered
these secondary factors of nonobviousness, that court did not err in reaching its
decision).
166. 175 F.3d 994, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
167. See id. at 999, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616 (indicating that the phrase “at the
time the invention was made” contained in 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. IV 1998)
protects inventors from an obviousness analysis based on hindsight); see also Uniroyal,
Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1051-52, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1434, 1438
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that application of the obviousness standards requires
courts to go back to the time the invention was made and that “when prior art
references require selective combination by [a] court to render obvious a subsequent
invention, there must be some reason for the combination other than the hindsight
gleaned from the invention itself”) (quoting Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774
F.2d 1132, 1143, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 543, 551 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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art references to invalidate the patent application based on
obviousness.168 The court mandated that the finder of obviousness
identify prior art, assess the knowledge of one skilled in the art, and
analyze the nature of the problem solved by the inventor.169 The
determiner of obviousness cannot simply discuss ways to combine sets
of prior art references so that they teach the claimed invention
without actual evidence.170 On the other hand, in In re Oggero,171 the
Federal Circuit held that in a crowded art, the references do not
need to suggest explicitly the combination of references to teach the
invention, provided that the prior art does not teach away from the
combination of such references.172
C. Enablement
The enablement standard requires that the patent applicant specify
explicitly to the public the key aspects of the invention in return for a
patent-granted monopoly.173 Section 112 of the patent statute and
Federal Circuit case law have broken down enablement into the
requirements of written description,174 best mode,175 and
definiteness.176
168. See Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 1000, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617 (asserting that
“[c]ombining prior art references without evidence of such a suggestion, teaching,
or motivation simply takes the inventor’s disclosure as a blueprint for piecing
together the prior art to defeat patentability,” which is “the essence of hindsight”).
169. See id. at 999, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617 (declaring that these factors
provide evidence of a suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine prior art
references).
170. See id. (commenting that general statements about the teaching of multiple
references, which are merely conclusory, are not evidence when standing alone).
171. No. 99-1116, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18477 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 1999)
(unpublished opinion).
172. See id. at *4 (noting that the motivation to combine the teachings of the prior
art arose from apparent gains in convenience; therefore, an invention using the
combined teachings would have been obvious in view of prior patents).
173. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring the applicant to explain the precise
subject matter that is claimed and the manner in which it can be made and used).
174. See id. (requiring a written description of the claimed invention); see also
Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452-53, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
293, 296-97 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112
pertaining to the written description); In re Dossel, 115 F.3d 942, 944-46, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1881, 1883-85 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing the written description
requirement and how to meet it in detail).
175. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (mandating the applicant to explain the best
mode of use of the invention that the applicant contemplates); see also Standard Oil,
774 F.2d at 452-53, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 296-97 (explaining that the best mode
requirement is addressed at the time of filing).
176. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring a description of the invention in full
and exact terms); see also Standard Oil, 774 F.2d at 452-53, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 29697 (noting that “the descriptive part of the specification aids in ascertaining the
scope and meaning of the claims in as much as the words of the claims must be based
upon the description”).
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1.

Written description
The written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994)
forces the patent applicant to adequately describe the subject matter
of the invention in the specification.177 The requirement is openended in that there are no restrictions as to how the specification
should describe the invention;178 instead, it must convey with
reasonable clarity to one skilled in the art, that the inventor has
captured the invention at the time of filing the application.179
The written description in the specification works to limit the
claims, especially in biotech cases. In In re Thorne,180 the Federal
Circuit held that method claims for a biological purification process
must recite process modifications disclosed in the written description
that are essential to practice the claimed invention.181
In National Recovery Technologies, Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Systems,
Inc.,182 the Federal Circuit stated “a claim is not invalid for lack of
operability simply because the invention does not work perfectly under
all conditions.”183 If, however, a claim is broader than the enablement
taught in the specification because it requires one skilled in the art to
conduct undue experimentation to practice the invention, then that
inoperability invalidates the claim.184
177. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (mandating the applicant to specify fully and
clearly how the invention can be made and used so that anyone skilled in the
relevant field can also make and use the invention).
178. See id. (requiring a written description but giving no suggestions that a
particular form must be followed in presenting the description).
179. See id. (requiring applicants to explain the invention so as to allow repetition
and use by someone knowledgeable in the field).
180. No. 98-1329, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2108 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 1999) (per
curiam) (unpublished decision) (limiting the scope of the patent claim precisely to
what is set forth in the written description).
181. See id. (suggesting that inclusion of such process modifications in the written
description alone is insufficient enablement).
182. 166 F.3d 1190, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (ruling that while
there is no requirement that the invention work perfectly under all conditions, the
specification in the patent application must nevertheless “enable one of ordinary skill
in the art to practice the invention embodied in [the] claim without undue
experimentation”).
183. Id. at 1196, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (emphasis in original) (discussing
what the specification in the patent application must contain in order to make it
enabling) (citing Hildreth v. Mastoras, 257 U.S. 27, 34 (1921) (“The machine
patented may be imperfect in its operation; but if it embodies the general principle
and works . . . it is enough.”)); Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1077, 191
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 439, 444 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam) (“The mere fact that the system
has some drawbacks, or that under certain postulated conditions it may not work . . .
does not detract from the operability of the disclosed equipment to perform its
described function.”).
184. See Nat’l Recovery Tech., 166 F.3d at 1196, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676
(stating if someone skilled in the art cannot reproduce the new invention without
the need to conduct undue experimentation, the claim will fail under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 due to lack of enabling).
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In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc.,185 the Federal Circuit reiterated
that the enablement analysis set forth in In re Wands186 applies to both
ex parte prosecution and inter partes litigation.187 The court held the
Wands analytical framework for enablement analysis applied
regardless of the situation.188 This analysis includes consideration of
the following factors:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented (3) the presence or absence of
working examples (4) the nature of the invention (5) the state of
the prior art (6) the relative skill of those in the art (7) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art and (8) the breadth of
189
the claims.

2.

Best mode
The best mode requirement, under 35 U.S.C. § 112, requires that a
patent’s specification include the inventor’s best mode for carrying
out his or her invention.190 This requirement applies only if the
inventor has a preferred way of practicing the invention.191 The
applicant need not identify the best mode as such.192
This
requirement, however, forces the applicant to disclose the best mode

185. 188 F.3d 1362, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
186. 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(“Whether undue experimentation is needed is not a single, simple factual
determination, but rather is a conclusion reached by weighing many factual
considerations.”).
187. See Enzo Biochem, 188 F.3d at 1372, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136; see also
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016,
1027 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (applying Wands factors to inter partes cases).
188. See Enzo Biochem, 188 F.3d at 1372, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135-36 (stating
that Wands factors are applicable in both ex parte and inter partes contexts, and that
the enablement determination is made retrospectively).
189. Id. at 1371, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135-36.
190. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
191. See Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1209-10, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1024 (explaining that
if an inventor subjectively contemplates a best mode for the invention, that mode
must be set out in the application in order to prevent the inventor from concealing it
from the public. The rights gained through the grant of a patent are an exchange
for public knowledge of the invention and its best mode of use.); see also Chemcast
Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927-28, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033, 1036-37
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (asserting that determination of best mode requires subjectively
discerning whether the inventor contemplated a best mode, and if so, objectively
determining whether the best mode was sufficiently set forth in the application); In re
Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 816, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537, 544 (C.C.P.A. 1980)
(“[T]here is no objective standard by which to judge the adequacy of a best mode
disclosure. Instead, only evidence of concealment (accidental or intentional) is to be
considered.”); In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772, 135 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 311, 315 (C.C.P.A.
1962) (stating that the reason inventors are required to disclose their best mode is to
prevent concealment from the public).
192. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (mandating the best mode to be explained in the
application, if one is contemplated, but not requiring the applicant to state that the
method described is the best mode).
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in sufficient detail to allow one skilled in the art to practice it without
undue experimentation,193 as opposed to concealing it from the
public.194
In Ricoh Co. v. Nashua Corp.,195 the Federal Circuit held that an
inventor’s unrebutted testimony may prove that the embodiment of
the invention disclosed in the patent serves as the best mode of the
invention.196 Such is the case when the alleged best mode used to
implement the commercial product, which seems better than the
patent’s best embodiment, simply reduces manufacturing costs.197
In Evans Medical Ltd., v. American Cyanamid Co.,198 the Federal
Circuit held that an inventor discloses the best mode of a biotech
invention if she can meet the requirements of access by the patent
examiner to the microorganism during pendency of the application
and public access to the material after issuance of the patent.199 An
inventor may meet these requirements by filing the preferred
embodiment as a biological deposit, referring to the embodiment in
the specification of the patent, and relying on the ordinary skill of the
art at filing to bridge the gap of undue experimentation with
knowledge of a well-established technique.200
193. See Nat’l Recovery Tech., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190,
1196, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 1676 (suggesting that the need for undue
experimentation will result in a failure to satisfy the enabling requirement of 35
U.S.C. § 112); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (requiring a description of the
invention sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to reproduce and use the
invention).
194. See Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 928, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036-37 (explaining
that an inventor may not conceal from the public the best way to make and use the
invention); see also Ricoh Co. v. Nashua Corp., No. 97-1344, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
2672, at *15 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 1999) (unpublished decision) (discussing the best
mode requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and asserting that there is no need to disclose
every mode of use).
195. See Ricoh, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2672, at *15.
196. See id. at *14-15 (finding no evidence of clear error in the district court’s
conclusion that the inventors described the best mode contemplated at the time of
the patent application, and upholding the district court’s finding in the case).
197. See id. at *14 (upholding the district court’s finding that “while the
commercial embodiment was potentially relevant to what the inventors thought was
the best mode, it was more relevant of the best and cheapest mode of manufacturing
the cartridge, not necessarily of practicing the invention”).
198. 215 F.3d 1347, 1999 WL 594310, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1455 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
9, 1999) (unpublished decision).
199. See Evans Med., 1999 WL 594310, at *6, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460-61
(relying on the court’s prior ruling in In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1220-21, 227
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90, 93-94 (Fed. Cir. 1985) which stated that the two policy concerns
involving biological patents were access to the invention by the PTO during
pendency and access by the public after issuance of the patent); see also In re
Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 99 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (establishing that
restricting access to biological material involved in a patent application to those
authorized by the applicant during the pendency of the patent application but
allowing full public access thereafter was acceptable).
200. See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d at 1392-94, 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 102-03
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In Calabrese v. Square D Co.,201 the Federal Circuit noted that the
application of the best mode requirement depends on the completely
subjective determination of whether at the time the inventor filed the
patent application, he preferred a mode of practicing the claimed
invention more than any other.202 The court held that the inventor’s
state of mind is quite relevant to resolving the question of whether
the best mode should be disclosed.203
D. Means-Plus-Function
The patent statute allows for means-plus-function claims, which
provide the inventor a drafting tool to enable any means for
performing a specified function.204 Courts often struggle with the
equivalent means enabled by this type of claim and the doctrine of
equivalents.205
In WMS Gaming Inc. v. International Game Technology,206 the Federal
Circuit addressed literal infringement of a computer means-plusfunction claim.207 The court held that when “the disclosed structure
(concluding that an applicant may withhold access by the public to the invention
during the pendency of the application, provided that the patent examiner is
accorded necessary access, and anyone skilled in the art can rely on the written
disclosure in the application).
201. No. 98-1550, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21930 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 13, 1999) (per
curiam) (unpublished decision), dismissed, No. 00-1322, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 15556
(Fed. Cir. June 16, 2000).
202. See id. at *3-4 (referring to Chemcast Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1033 (Fed. Cir. 1990), which explains the requirement that the inventor specify his
or her preferred mode in the patent application).
203. See id. at *4-5 (stating that “the first step in determining compliance with the
best mode requirement is wholly subjective and involves determining ‘whether, at
the time the inventor filed his patent application, he knew of a mode of practicing
his claimed invention that he considered to be better that any other’” (quoting
Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 927-28, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036-37)).
204. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6 (1994) (“An element of a claim . . . may be expressed
as a means or a step for performing a specified function without the recital of
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claims shall be construed to
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification
and equivalents thereof.”).
205. Under the doctrine of equivalents, a product or process that does not literally
infringe on the express terms of a patent claim may infringe if there is substantial
equivalence between the elements of the accused product or process and the
patented invention. Compare Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520
U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997) (discussing the need for a component-bycomponent analysis of the two products or process), with Al Site Corp. v. VSI Int’l,
Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1321, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining
that under the means-plus-function test, a device must perform the exact purpose
indicated in the claim element). See also infra notes 220-232 (explaining that both
tests typically produce the same result due to their focus on insubstantial differences
between the products or process).
206. 184 F.3d 1339, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
207. See id. at 1346-54, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389-96 (assessing whether, despite
a lack of “literal” or exact similarity between two slot machines, the functional
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is a computer, or microprocessor, programmed to carry out an
algorithm, the disclosed structure is not the general purpose
computer, but rather the special purpose computer programmed to
perform the disclosed algorithm.”208 After finding no literal
infringement, the court found infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, where the accused method had insubstantial differences
such as unclaimed steps.209
In Rodime PLC v. Seagate Technology, Inc.,210 the Federal Circuit
addressed the issue of whether a claim falls within the 35 U.S.C. § 112
¶ 6 means-plus-function analytical framework.211 The court held that,
even though the word “means” in a claim element creates a
presumption that 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 applies, the patent rebuts this
presumption when the claim element recites a “means” without a
function, or when the claim recites sufficient structure or subject
matter for performing that function.212 In Rodime, the Federal Circuit
found that a detailed recitation of structure for performing the
function of the means overcame the means-plus-function
presumption.213 The quantum of structure disclosed in the
specification to avoid the presumption amounts to sufficient detail in
the structure to perform the entire claimed function.214
In Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp.,215 the Federal Circuit
distinguished its Chiuminatta decision on the analytical framework of
means-plus-function claims.216 In Odetics VIII, the court held that the
district court had erred, and that the means-plus-function analysis
does not require a component-by-component equivalence between

similarity between the two constituted an infringement).
208. Id. at 1349, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
209. See id. at 1352-54, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394-96 (finding no literal
infringement due to dissimilarities between the exact functioning of the slot
machines, the district court did find that that the addition of an unclaimed step in
the selection of random numbers and payoff amounts in the accused slot machine
was not substantially dissimilar from the patented machine under the doctrine of
equivalents).
210. 174 F.3d 1294, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (evaluating
whether a computer hard drive manufacturer’s patent included “thermal
compensation” in the “positioning means” of electromagnetic read/write heads).
211. See id. at 1301-06, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434-37.
212. See id. at 1305-06, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
213. See id. at 1304, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1436.
214. See id. at 1305, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437.
215. 185 F.3d 1259, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Odetics VIII”).
216. See id. at 1266-72, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229-33 (distinguishing the district
court’s reasoning in Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 807, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1923 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“Odetics VII”), wherein the Chiuminatta
decision was believed to require “component-by-component” equivalence between
the relevant structure identified in the patent and the portion of the accused devise
asserted to be structurally equivalent).
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the structure identified in the patent and relevant portion of the
accused device.217 The Odetics VIII court ruled: “[t]he individual
components, if any, of an overall structure that corresponds to the
claimed function are not claim limitations. Rather, the claim
limitation is the overall structure corresponding to the claimed
function.”218 Thus, the Odetics VIII court broadened the reach of
means-plus-function claims, which had been severely limited by its
Chiuminatta decision.219
In Al-Site Corp. v. VSI International, Inc.,220 the Federal Circuit
utilized the doctrine of equivalents to assess the sufficiency of a
finding of equivalence in a means-plus-function claim.221 The court
found several differences between 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and the
doctrine of equivalents.222 The Federal Circuit held that “an
equivalent structure or act under § 112 for literal infringement must
have been available at the time of patent issuance while an equivalent
under the doctrine of equivalents may arise after patent issuance and
before the time of infringement.”223
Hence, the court leaves open the possibility that an “after-arising”
technology could infringe under the doctrine of equivalents, without
literally infringing as an equivalent under a means-plus-function
claim.224 Though such disparity exists, the Federal Circuit also
217. See id. at 1267-68, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434-37.
218. Id. at 1268, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
219. See id. at 1266-72, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229-33 (“The appropriate degree
of specificity is provided by the statute itself; The relevant structure is that which
‘corresponds’ to the claimed function. Further deconstruction or parsing is
incorrect.”).
220. 174 F.3d 1308, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
221. See id. at 1322, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169 (finding that though the statute
requires a finding of “literal infringement” under the means-plus-function test, the
jury’s finding of “equivalence” in the accused structure would suffice for the meansplus-function analysis).
222. See id. at 1319-22, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167-68. Among these differences,
the court found: (1) 35 U.S.C. § 112 is restrictive, limiting equivalence to the
“structure, material, or acts described in the specification . . . ,” while the doctrine of
equivalents “extends enforcement of claim terms beyond their literal reach in the
event” of ‘equivalence’ of “elements”; (2) under § 112, a structural equivalent “must
have been available at the time of the issuance of the claim” (i.e., cannot incorporate
‘after-arising’ technology), whereas “‘after-arising equivalent’ infringes . . . under the
doctrine of equivalents”; and (3) under § 112, “the accused device must perform the
identical function as recited in the claim element while the doctrine of equivalents
may be satisfied” if such functions are “substantially” similar. Id.
223. Id. at 1320, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
224. See id. (explaining that one difference between § 116 and the doctrine of
equivalents is “temporal” (citing Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts v. Cardinal Indus.
Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that “the doctrine of equivalents is
necessary because one cannot predict the future”))). In Chiuminatta, the court
explained that an element may not be an infringement under § 112 because it “was
not disclosed in the patent;” but it may still be an infringement because it
nevertheless may be so similar to the patented element that it constitutes an
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emphasized that the doctrine of equivalents and equivalents under a
means-plus-function analysis often derive the same result because
both analyses include an assessment of the insubstantiality of the
differences.225
E. Inventorship
Inventorship guarantees right of attribution to the inventor.226 The
nonjoinder and misjoinder requirements of inventorship can
invalidate a patent that with deceptive intent fails to join an inventor
or joins a party who did not contribute to the invention.227
Inventorship becomes particularly problematic when inventors work
for multiple entities including the government.228 Inventorship also
works in conjunction with assignment to determine who owns the
rights to the patented invention.229
“equivalent under the doctrine of equivalents.” See Chiuminatta, 145 F.3d at 1310.
225. See Ali-Site Corp., 174 F.3d at 1321, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
226. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent . . . .”).
227. See 35 U.S.C. § 256 (inventorship may be corrected with a certificate of
correction as long as the error arose without deceptive intent). See, e.g., Pointer v.
Six Wheel Corp., 177 F.2d 153, 157 (9th Cir. 1949) (“[I]n the case of a patent which
is a joint invention, a patent issued to only one of the inventors is void.”) (citations
omitted); see also 35 U.S.C. § 116; Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid, Inc.,
196 F.3d 1366, 1374, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1806 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating, in
response to a claim that misjoinder or nonjoinder invalidates a patent, “[35 U.S.C.]
§ 116 allows correction in all misjoinder cases featuring an error and in those
nonjoinder cases where the unarmed inventor is free of deceptive intent”).
228. Parties who make an invention or discovery while performing duties for an
employer are generally held not to have an individual right to a patent, unless the
employment contract provides otherwise. See Schroeder v. Tracor, No. 99-1281, 1999
WL 1021055 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 1999) (invalidating patents received by an individual
employee upon cross-motion brought by the employer for breach of contract).
Similarly, when an invention or discovery is made while working for a government
entity, where the work consisted of research and development and/or utilized
government resources and time, the individual is barred from personally patenting
the invention, and the government is typically allowed to utilize the invention
without paying royalties. See Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d
385, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 453 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (denying individual government
researchers’ attempt to patent a safety helmet designed when its development was
inextricably linked to the overall naval research effort).
229. See Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
686 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (maintaining that the grant of a patent is the right to invoke the
state’s power to exclude others from utilizing the discovery without the patentee’s
consent). Compare Clow & Sons, Inc. v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 313 F.2d 46, 136
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397 (5th Cir. 1963) (holding that the philosophy of patent law is to
reward only the first and original inventor), with 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994) (“Patents
shall have the attributes of personal property . . . [P]atents shall be assignable in
law . . . .”); Valmet Paper Mach., Inc. v. Beloit Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1085, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1794 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (finding that patent rights can be assigned,
and valid assignments vest independent authority in assignee to enforce rights
stemming therefrom).
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In Schroeder v. Tracor, Inc.,230 the Federal Circuit sided with the
employer of the inventor.231 The court found a shop right for the
employer based on an employment agreement in which the inventor
agreed to assign all of his rights in inventions or improvements
conceived by him regardless of whether they were within the scope of
his employment.232 The Federal Circuit upheld this assignment as a
basis for a shop right defense due to the inventor’s conduct in
allowing his employer to use the patented inventions for a number of
years without objecting or demanding royalties.233
In University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,234
the Federal Circuit held that federal patent law preempts any state
law that purports to define rights based on inventorship.235 The court
noted that allowing state inroads into the Patent Act’s inventorship
standard with independent state laws would confuse the issue with
different requirements and lead to disparate remedies.236 Such
legislation would frustrate the objectives of authorship for inventors
and uniform federal patent laws.237 The court found no room under
the Patent Act’s detailed standards for inventorship because it
contains explicit language foreclosing state supplementation of the
national standard.238
F. Inequitable Conduct
A patent applicant may render her patent unenforceable by
230. No. 99-1281, 1999 WL 1021055 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 1999).
231. See id. at *3 (assessing a former employee’s claim of infringement on patents
he obtained for his “pair antenna design” while working for the defendant
company).
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. 196 F.3d 1366, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
235. See id. at 1372, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805 (noting that since its inception
in Article I of the Constitution, patent law has developed with the dual objectives of
rewarding inventors and supplying uniform national standards). 35 U.S.C.’s explicit,
detailed, and comprehensive regulation of patent law constitutes a pervasive
regulatory scheme demonstrating Congress’ intent for federal law to dominate the
field. Id.
236. See id. (asserting that to allow independent inventorship standard under state
law could grant property rights to an individual who would not qualify under federal
law, or may grant greater relief than under federal law).
237. See id.
238. See id. (concluding that Colorado’s inventorship standards ran afoul of
federal “field preemption” doctrine, whereby 35 U.S.C.’s explicit, detailed, and
comprehensive regulation of patent law evidenced Congress’s intent to institute a
“scheme of federal regulation so comprehensive, that no room remains for a state to
supplement”). The application of Colorado law on the matter of inventorship rights
for the reformulated infant formula raised the specter of inconsistent results,
confounding the dual federal objectives of patent law, and was, therefore,
inappropriately applied. See id.
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misleading the PTO during prosecution of the patent.239 The
applicant has a duty of candor in her dealing with the examiner.
Withholding or submitting false material information with the intent
to deceive violates this duty and renders the patent unenforceable.240
In Elk Corp. of Dallas v. GAF Bldg. Materials Corp.,241 the Federal
Circuit reviewed the inequitable conduct requirement that prior art
references not disclosed to the PTO are not merely cumulative of
other references before the PTO.242 The court also addressed the
issue of whether the applicant had knowledge of how material the
reference not disclosed to the PTO was to the patentability of the
invention.243 The Federal Circuit held that intent to deceive and
knowledge of the materiality may be shown by circumstantial
evidence such as a request for a patent search report.244
In Origin Medsystems, Inc. v. General Surgical Innovations, Inc.,245 the
Federal Circuit touched on the elements of an inequitable conduct
analysis.246 The court held that the applicant’s intent to deceive must
be clear, especially when the PTO knows of the prior art and its
relationship to the prosecution.247 According to the Federal Circuit,
an applicant’s attempt to merely distinguish prior art is not a material
misrepresentation, even if the art is not distinguishable.248 The court
further noted that inequitable conduct is “rarely” appropriate in
summary judgment adjudication due to the subjective finding of
intent to deceive.249
239. See 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03[6], at 19-247 (1998)
(describing the consequences of fraud and inequitable conduct during patent
proceedings with the PTO).
240. See id. § 19.03[6][b], at 19-251 (noting that if the applicant obtained a patent
through fraud or inequitable conduct, the Supreme Court has applied “the doctrine
of unclean hands” to render the patent invalid or unenforceable).
241. 168 F.3d 28, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
242. See id. at 31-32, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855-56 (finding prior art patents
were material even though they were merely cumulative of specific patents that had
been disclosed to the PTO).
243. See id. at 32, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1856-57 (determining that the district
court was correct in finding that materiality and knowledge of materiality existed).
244. See id. (holding that intent of a patent applicant to deceive the PTO rarely
can, and does not need to be, proven by direct evidence. Instead, the court
determines whether inequitable conduct can be established by looking at the overall
facts and circumstances of the applicant’s conduct).
245. No. 98-1416, 1999 WL 507160 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
246. See id. (explaining that in an equitable conduct analysis, the PTO looks at the
applicant’s intent to deceive and whether the misrepresentation was material).
247. See id. at *2 (stating there must be clear and convincing evidence that the
patent applicant specifically intended to commit a prohibited act).
248. See id. at *1 (noting there was a genuine issue as to whether the applicant’s
statement to the board was material).
249. See id. at *2 (declaring the district court erred in granting summary judgment
on the applicant’s intent to deceive because if the applicant’s statement was a
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In Destron/IDI, Inc. v. Electronic Identification Devices, Ltd.,250 the
Federal Circuit discussed the inequitable conduct standard for intent
to deceive the PTO.251 When the prosecuting attorney makes a good
faith effort to disclose the results of his investigation, such as precritical date sales information, he meets his duty of good faith and
candor.252 Trying to defend the results of the investigation does not
automatically lead to a finding that the applicant intentionally
attempted to deceive the PTO.253
G. Other Patentability Procedures
1.

Interference
When a patent application and another pending application or
issued patent present a potential overlap of subject matter and
priority, the PTO may administer an interference proceeding to
resolve priority.254 The examiner names a senior and junior party
based on who filed first.255 The junior party bears the burden of
proof.256
In Cavanagh v. McMahon,257 the Federal Circuit held that the junior
party must prove by a preponderance actual reduction to practice
prior to the senior party’s filing date of the evidence.258 The court
noted that simply because a junior party makes a prima facie case of
actual reduction to practice for purposes of declaring an
material misrepresentation, then a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether he intended to deceive the PTO).
250. No. 98-1242, 1999 WL 37614 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
251. See id. (affirming the district court’s decision that the information provided
to the PTO by Destron/IDI and Hughes Aircraft did not constitute an intent to
deceive and was not, therefore, inequitable conduct).
252. See id. at *1 (asserting that the testimony of Destron’s attorney was credible
and did not constitute inequitable conduct).
253. See id. at *2 (noting that disorganization and poor communication does not
meet the clear and convincing evidence standard of intent to deceive).
254. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1994) (stating that “the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences shall determine questions of priority of the inventions and may
determine questions of patentability.”). After the review, the commission will “issue
the patent to the applicant who is adjudged to be the prior inventor.” Id.
255. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.611 (2000) (explaining that the PTO will send a notice of
declaration of an interference to each party and outlining what the notice will
contain).
256. See id. § 1.657 (establishing that in an interference proceeding, the junior
party has the burden of establishing that they filed first by a preponderance of the
evidence standard).
257. No. 98-1304, 1999 WL 197176 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
258. See id. at *2 (noting that a hearing held by the PTO Board of Patent Appeals
on Interferences found that the junior party did not prove actual reduction by
preponderance of the evidence).
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interference, this does not mean that the junior party has met the
preponderance of the evidence test.259
The quantum of the
interference proceeding is greater than the prima facie standard,
even if the senior party does not present rebuttal evidence.260
2.

Reexamination
In a PTO reexamination proceeding, the patentee or a third party
may test the validity of an issued patent based on newly discovered
prior art.261 Reexamination requires a “substantial question of
patentability,” meaning prior patents or printed publications material
to anticipation or obviousness.262 This procedure enables either the
patentee to confirm the validity of his patent or the accused infringer
to stay infringement litigation so that the PTO can reassess
patentability before the court addresses infringement.263 The
patentee, however, cannot broaden the scope of his claims during
reexamination.264
In Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Converse, Inc.,265 the Federal Circuit
adopted the same test to determine whether a patentee has
impermissibly broadened a claim in reexamination as that used in
reissue proceedings.266 The test, similar to reissue where the patentee
after two years can only narrow a claim, limits the patentee from
enlarging the claim’s scope beyond subject matter that would have
infringed the original patent.267 Problems usually arise when one
limitation in the amended claim broadens one limitation of the claim
and narrows the claim in another limitation.268 The court ruled that

259. See id. (explaining that the junior party’s argument was flawed because a
declaration of interference under the prima facie standard does not exclude the
Board from determining that the applicant did not satisfy the preponderance of the
evidence standard).
260. See id. (ruling that simply because a declaration of interference was
determined and the prima facie burden was met, the junior party does not
necessarily satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard).
261. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.555 (2000) (outlining the process for a request for
reexamination by the PTO).
262. See id. § 1.510.
263. See id. § 1.530 (outlining the procedures for patent owners to make
statements in reexamination proceedings).
264. See id. § 1.552 (declaring patent claims will be reexamined on the basis of the
original patent or printed materials). Further, questions raised that do not apply to
the original patent will not be answered during the reexamination process. See id.
265. 183 F.3d 1369, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
266. See id. at 1373-75, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521-22 (stating a patentee has
impermissibly broadened a claim in reexamination if there is any subject matter
included that would not have infringed the original patent).
267. See id. at 1374-75, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521.
268. See id. at 1375, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521-22 (noting that in order for the
court to examine proper claim construction, it must look at the whole claim in
context, and not simply the claim itself).
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such an effect does not exist when each of the disputed limitations
operates to define the same element of the claim.269
In Abbey v. Robert Bosch GmbH,270 the Federal Circuit ruled that
summary judgment on infringement is proper when the
reexamination proceeding leads to an alteration of the original
claims.271
Defendant successfully called for a reexamination
proceeding forcing the patentee to amend his claims to include
additional limitations.272
In so doing, the patentee had to
substantively change the scope of his claims.273 The court held that
the patent owner could enforce the substantively changed claims of
the reexamined patent only after the date of the reexamination
certificate.274
3.

Continuation applications
A popular way to gain the patent advantage over a competitor’s
new products consists of perpetual patent prosecution based on a
single original application and disclosure.275 To do this, the patent
applicant maintains a continuation or a continuation-in-part
application in the PTO and amends the claim language to cover the
competitors new product, provided that the initial disclosure was
broad enough to lend itself to the amended claims.276

269. See id. at 1374-75, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521-22 (holding the district court
erred in determining that the patentee impermissibly broadened its claims during
the reexamination proceeding because the district court examined a single element
of the claim). Moreover, the Court of Appeals declared that it is necessary to
interpret the entire claim in context. See id.
270. No. 99-1169, 1999 WL 819683 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
271. See id. at *3 (finding that “substantive changes” were made during the
reexamination proceeding and that the claims were no longer “identical”).
272. See id. (noting significance in the fact that defendant amended the claim due
to a prior art rejection).
273. See id. (ruling that because the patentee substantially changed his claims,
summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate).
274. See id.
275. See ALAN L. DURHAM , PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS 32-33 (1999) (noting that patent
prosecution is a lengthy process, and applicant may chose to file a continuation to
the original application in order to hold the original filing date, which is important
in determining priority of invention as compared to competitor’s inventions or
references).
276. See 4 CHISUM, supra note 239, § 13.03(2)-(3), at 13-12 to 13-14 (defining a
continuation application as a second application that contains the same disclosure as
the original application, which is entitled to the benefits of the filing date of the
original application under 35 U.S.C. § 120 as long as the conditions of
codependency, cross-referencing, and identity of ownership are met). Chisum also
defines a continuation-in-part application as a second application which repeats
some portion or all of the original application and adding matter not disclosed in
the earlier application, which are entitled to the filing date of the continuation-inpart application rather than that of the patent application. See id.; see also HARMON,
supra note 85, at 196 (stating that the initial disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112 may be
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The Federal Circuit, in Ricoh Co. v. Nashua Corp.,277 reinforced its
sanction of the above mentioned continuation application practice.278
The court rejected the argument that a competitor should be entitled
to intervening rights for the products developed while the patentee
left a continuation application pending.279 In doing so, the court
distinguished this practice from the impermissible broadening of
claims two years after issuance in a reissue proceeding.280 The court
held, “Absent congressional indication that intervening rights are to
be applied in the context of continuation applications, we reject
[the] argument that we should judicially adopt equitable safeguards,
in contravention of a established precedent, when Congress itself has
declined to do so.”281
III. INFRINGEMENT
The affirmative cause of action in patent litigation consists of
accusing the defendant of infringing the patent.282 The patent
statute, under 35 U.S.C. § 271, gives the patent owner the right to
exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell any
product or process covered by the claims of the patent.283 The scope
of the patent monopoly extends to the entire country and lasts twenty
years from the filing of the patent application.284 To find patent
infringement, the court must evaluate the claim construction for
meaning and scope. Once the court assigns the proper meaning and
scope to the claims, the court must compare the accused product or
process to the claims to decide whether they literally infringe or
infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.285
written broadly without describing all species the claim encompasses).
277. No. 97-1344, 1999 WL 88969 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
278. See id. at *2-3 (holding on the authority of Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v.
Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
that filing a patent for the purpose of excluding a competitor’s product from the
market is expressly permissible).
279. See id. at *3.
280. See id.
281. Id.
282. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a
patent shall be liable as an infringer.”).
283. See id. § 271(a) (1994) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention during
the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”).
284. See id. § 154(a)(2) (1994). Until a patent issues, it cannot be infringed, even
by someone who knows that an application is “pending.” Once the patent does issue,
the patent owner can force any infringing activity to cease, even if that activity has
already begun. See DURHAM, supra note 275, at 124.
285. See DURHAM, supra note 275, at 50 (noting that guidance as to the meaning
and scope of a date can be found in the plain meaning of a word, the specification of
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A. Claim Construction
Since the Supreme Court’s Markman decision,286 district courts have
held Markman hearings before trial to determine claim
construction.287 The Federal Circuit has decided that as claim
construction is a question of law, it should receive de novo review on
appeal.288
In Finnigan Corp. v. International Trade Commission,289 the Federal
Circuit distinguished its decision from Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies,
Inc.,290 which empowered the Federal Circuit to consider any claim
construction argument de novo on appeal.291 The Finnigan court held
that the appellee waived the new claim construction argument by not
raising it before the International Trade Commission’s administrative
law judge.292 The Federal Circuit noted that:
A party’s argument should not be a moving target. The argument
at the trial and appellate level should be consistent, thereby
ensuring a clear presentation of the issue to be resolved, an
adequate opportunity for response and evidentiary development by
the opposing party, and a record reviewable by the appellate court
that is properly crystallized around and responsive to the asserted
293
argument.

The court distinguished Cybor, recognizing that the decision “does
not require us to effectively retry claim construction de novo by
a patent claim, the claims prosecution history, and evaluation of other claims); see
also SRI Int’l v. Matsushsta Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577,
583 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (asserting that claims are not to be construed to cover or not
cover the device in question; only after the claims have been construed without
reference to the accused device can the claims be applied to determine
infringement).
286. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), affirming 52
F.3d 967, 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that
“[q]uestions of construction are questions of law for the judge, not questions of fact
for the jury”) (citations omitted).
287. See HARMON, supra note 85, at 208 (noting, following Markman, the rise of
trial court evidentiary hearings prior to trial where the court resolves disputed
meanings and technical scope claims); see, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S.
Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1577, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1019, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(discussing the district court’s conducting of pre-trial Markman hearing to determine
the scope of the claim at issue by evaluating the claimed language and prosecution
attorney).
288. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (“Because claim
construction is a matter of law, the construction given the claims is reviewed de novo
on appeal.”).
289. 180 F.3d 1354, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
290. 138 F.3d 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
291. See id. at 1456, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174 (“[W]e therefore reaffirm that,
as a purely legal question, we review claim construction de novo on appeal including
any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction.”).
292. See Finnigan, 180 F.3d at 1362, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
293. Id. at 1363, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
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consideration of novel arguments not first presented to the tribunal
whose decision is on review.”294
In Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,295 the Federal Circuit held
that the patent drafter can use identical terms in the specification to
describe different concepts.296 When the term comes up in the claim,
the context of the claim will determine which concept it identifies.297
In this case, the court found context in the claim’s preamble
language to support one of the two constructions in the
specification.298
In Voice Technologies Group, Inc. v. VMC Systems, Inc.,299 the Federal
Circuit held that claim construction allows testimony from the
inventor as a competent witness to explain the invention and what
she intended to convey in the specification and cover in the claims.300
The court clarified its decision in Markman as not automatically
disqualifying inventors as witnesses.301 Instead, the court noted, “an
inventor is a competent witness to explain the invention and what was
intended to be conveyed by the specification and covered by the
claims.”302 In addition, the testimony of the inventor often provides
background information, such as an explanation of contemporary
problems in the art at the invention’s conception and the inventor’s
solution to these problems.303
B. Literal Infringement
Once the district court has determined the claim construction, the
first level of analysis in a suit for patent infringement is whether the
accused product or process literally infringes the claims of the
asserted patent.304
294. Id. (emphasis in original).
295. 182 F.3d 1298, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
296. See id. at 1310-11, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1170.
297. See id.
298. See id. (finding the word “spot” had two different meanings in the same
patent application because it was used in different contexts, and the reader was “on
notice” of the different meanings).
299. 164 F.3d 605, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
300. See id. at 615-16, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340-41.
301. See id. (“This court in Markman did not hold that the inventor cannot explain
the technology and what was invented and claimed; the Federal Circuit held only
that the inventor can not by later testimony change the invention and the claims
from their meaning at the time the patent was drafted and granted.”).
302. Id. at 615, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341.
303. See id.
304. See Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (commenting that a patent is said to
be literally infringed if the claims exactly describe the thing accused of
infringement); see also London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1539, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating there can be no literal
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In SunTiger, Inc. v. Scientific Research Funding Group,305 the Federal
Circuit explained that a claim need not read on the entirety of an
accused device for literal infringement.306 The court also explained
that when a claim requires a specific number of elements, the
addition of elements to the accused product may avoid literal
infringement.307 The court did not find such a situation in this case,
but suggests this method as a means of avoiding literal
infringement.308
C. Doctrine of Equivalents
When an accused product does not literally infringe the asserted
patent, the patent owner may assert infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents based on the court-created concept that insubstantial
differences will not evade infringement when the accused product
amounts to an equivalent of the claimed subject matter.309 The
Federal Circuit and even the Supreme Court have struggled over the
breadth of the infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,
especially in light of arguments made during the prosecution
history.310

infringement if a claim limitation is wholly missing from the accused device,
regardless of how insignificant).
305. 189 F.3d 1327, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
306. See id. at 1336, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816 (quoting Stiftung v. Renishaw
PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1178, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
307. See id. at 1336, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
308. See id. (finding that adding elements would not change the claim in this case
because “[t]he claim at issue here is not specific as to the number of elements (i.e.
dyes)”).
309. See 5A CHISUM, supra note 239, § 18.04, at 18-73 (stating that a product or a
process that does not correspond to the literal terms of the claim of a patent but
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same ways to obtain the
same result is an infringement under this doctrine). Moreover, the doctrine of
equivalents can work in reverse by excusing a product or process within the literal
terms of a claim that performs the prescribed function in a substantially different
way. See id. at 18-74; see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351,
1361, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473, 480 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that the purpose of the
doctrine is to do equity by forbidding the practice of fraud on a patent).
310. The courts face the dichotomy between the “necessity of employing the
clearest possible wording in preparing the specification and claims of a patent” as set
out in 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 and the “necessity of determining infringement without
the risk of injustice that may result from a blindered focus on words alone.” See
HARMON, supra note 85, at 273; see also, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 34, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1873 (1997) (declining to
abolish doctrine, or limit it, to copyists); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air
Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950) (noting judgment must be made in context of
invention: equiva lence is not bound by formula); London v. Carson Pirie Scott &
Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating
that “designing or inventing around patents to make new inventions is encouraged,”
but “piracy is not”).
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The Federal Circuit in Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices Inc.,311
expanded the preclusion of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents to apply to any amendment whose purpose is unclear and
not explained by the patentee.312 The court’s adoption of such a
strong influence of prosecution history estoppel over the doctrine of
equivalents follows the Supreme Court’s decision in Warner-Jenkinson
v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.313 The Federal Circuit noted that in
Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of
whether an amendment made in response to an enablement
rejection amounts to an amendment made for “reasons of
patentability” that gives rise to prosecution history estoppel.314
However, when the prosecution history of the patent does not
disclose the reasons for the addition of the limitation, even if the
amendment had not been necessary to overcome the prior art
rejection, Warner-Jenkinson requires a presumption that the applicant
added the limitation for a reason “related to patentability.”315 The
Federal Circuit then addressed the question of the scope of the
estoppel. The Federal Circuit interpreted Warner-Jenkinson quite
broadly:
In circumstances in which the Warner-Jenkinson presumption is
applicable, i.e., where the reason for an amendment is unclear
from an analysis of the prosecution history record, and unrebutted
by the patentee, the prosecution history estoppel arising therefrom
is total and completely ‘bars’ the application of the doctrine of
316
equivalents as to the amended limitation.

The court tried to establish a bright-line rule for the operation of
the doctrine of equivalents when reasonable competitors evaluate the
patent’s file history and try to determine the scope of any potential
estoppel.317
311. 172 F.3d 817, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
312. See id. at 832, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875 (holding prosecutory history
estoppel completely bars the application of the doctrine of equivalents where the
reason for an amendment is unclear or rebutted).
313. 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997).
314. See Sextant Avionique, 172 F.3d at 828-29, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872-73
(explaining arguments for and against deeming that an amendment made in
response to an enablement rejection an amendment made for reasons of
patentability).
315. See id. at 828, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872 (describing the conditions
necessary for prosecutory estoppel to arise); see also Warner Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 33,
41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873 (“Where no explanation is established, however, the
court should presume that the patent applicant had a substantial reason related to
patentability for including the limiting element added by amendment.”).
316. Sextant Avionique, 172 F.3d at 832, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
317. See id. (describing the difficulties inherent in determining scope of an
estoppel arising from operation of the Warner-Jenkinson presumption).
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Following the Sextant opinion, the Federal Circuit in Merck & Co. v.
Mylan Pharmaceutical, Inc.318 applied the court’s analysis of prosecution
history estoppel and infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents.319 The court held that prosecution history estoppel arises
when the applicant narrows the scope of her claims to avoid an
obviousness rejection.320 The applicant argued that she narrowed her
claims to comply with the Examiner’s restriction requirement; she
did not amend to avoid the Examiner’s obviousness rejection.321 The
Federal Circuit did not adopt the applicant’s interpretation because
the failure to pursue the broader claims, in such a situation, suggests
that the applicant amended in order to get around the rejection.322
The court held that the doctrine of equivalents cannot recapture
subject matter given up over such an obviousness rejection.323
The Federal Circuit in Ultrak, Inc. v. Radio Engineering Industries,
Inc.324 held that when a claim recites means-plus-function language,
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents looks to the written
description for the function.325 The doctrine then allows a finding of
infringement if the function and the accused equivalent function
achieve the same result.326 The court found that in that instance, the
differences between the claim and the accused device are
insubstantial.327
In Rival Co. v. Sunbeam Corp.,328 the Federal Circuit decided not to
address the question as to whether comparison of the patented
318. 190 F.3d 1335, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1954 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
319. See id. at 1340-42, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957-59.
320. See id. at 1340, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1957 (echoing the Warner-Jenkinson
decision to the extent that, because of prosecution history estoppel, claim scope
reduced for patentability reasons cannot be reclaimed).
321. See id. at 1340, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958 (finding that applicant amended
in response to obviousness rejection, notwithstanding the existence of a restriction
requirement).
322. See id. at 1340-42, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1958 (stating that the controlling
fact when analyzing an applicant’s motivation to amend is the reduction in claim
scope, indicating a response to unpatentability).
323. See id. (determining that the extent of estoppel does not automatically extend
to everything beyond a claim’s literal scope, but is determined by what applicant
released from the claim’s scope in response to prior art).
324. 215 F.3d 1339, 1999 WL 197173, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 8,
1999) (unpublished opinion).
325. See 1999 WL 197173, at *5, 52 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1528.
326. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1868 (1997) (approving function analysis as a part of the
triple identity test for doctrine of equivalents inquiry).
327. See Ultrak, 1999 WL 197173, at *5, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1530 (failing to
find the difference in amounts of lens protrusion as changing significantly the
function of allowing light to pass through).
328. No. 98-1198, 1999 WL 96416 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
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invention to the accused product as a whole runs contrary to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Warner-Jenkinson.329 The court found
that, as a matter of law, when an argument for infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents renders the distinction between two claim
limitations meaningless, that argument fails and the accused product
does not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.330
In Streamfeeder, LLC v. Sure-Feed Systems, Inc.,331 the Federal Circuit
explained the hypothetical claim analysis for prior art restriction as
relating to the doctrine of equivalents reasoned in Wilson Sporting
Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates.332 The court addressed the
procedural question of which party bears the burden of proof on the
issue of whether the hypothetical claim reads on the prior art.333 The
court held that an accused infringer has the burden of production to
place the asserted range of equivalence within the scope of the prior
art.334 The patent owner bears the burden of persuasion to show that
the claim does not cover the prior art.335
The court also discouraged using the Wilson hypothetical claim
analysis to redraft granted claims. The Federal Circuit held that:
While use of a hypothetical claim may permit a minor extension of
a claim to cover subject matter that is substantially equivalent to
that literally claimed, one cannot, in the course of litigation and
outside of the PTO, cut and trim, expanding here, and narrowing
there, to arrive at a claim that encompasses an accused device, but
avoids the prior art. Slight broadening is permitted at that point,
336
but not narrowing.

The Federal Circuit’s decision in Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kohyo
Kabushiki Co.337 reconsidered its all-elements analysis for the doctrine
of equivalents in light of the intervening decision of WarnerJenkinson.338 The court reviewed its precedent of “all-elements”
329. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (mandating
the application of doctrine of equivalents to the elements of claim, rather than to the
invention as a whole).
330. See Rival, 1999 WL 96416, at *7 (upholding summary judgment for
noninfringement where accused products did not possess an equivalent to a claim’s
limitations).
331. 175 F.3d 974, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
332. 904 F.2d 677, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
333. See Steamfeeder, 175 F.3d at 983, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521 (adopting the
Wilson court’s allocation of burdens between accused infringers and patentees).
334. See id. (differentiating between burden of going forward and burden of
persuasion).
335. See id. (finding no reason to shift burden of showing infringement to accused
infringer when inquiry into hypothetical claims is required).
336. Id.
337. 172 F.3d 1361, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
338. 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997).
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decisions beginning with Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.339
The Federal Circuit concluded that Warner-Jenkinson provided no
basis for the proposition that the Supreme Court intended to erase
the Federal Circuit’s many all-elements decisions because the analysis
limiting the doctrine of equivalents to each element or step does not
narrow equivalency in circumstances in which the accused has
changed a limitation.340 Moreover, Warner-Jenkinson makes the allelements analysis appropriate to identify “the role played by each
element in the context of the specific patent claim.”341
IV. INFRINGEMENT REMEDIES AND LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY
A. Damages
1.

Lost profits
In an action for patent infringement, a successful plaintiff can pray
for monetary relief based on her lost profits or a reasonable royalty
for a hypothetical patent license.342 In Grain Processing Corp. v.
American Maize-Products Co.,343 the Federal Circuit considered
noninfringing alternatives with respect to an award of lost profits.344
The court held that a substitute not on the market or for sale during
the period of infringement enters the calculus when determining
whether a patentee would have made additional profits but for the
infringement.345 Since the plaintiff may present market
reconstruction theories but for the infringement, the accused
infringer may present theories of his adoption of an acceptable
noninfringing alternative.346 The court decided that it was:
only by comparing the patented invention to its next best available
alternative(s) regardless of whether the alternative(s) were actually
339. 833 F.2d 931, 935, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1740 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(affirming ruling of no infringement where an “element-by-element comparison” of
two machines determined that they performed substantially different functions).
340. See Festo, 172 F.3d at 1370, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390 (“We discern in
Warner-Jenkinson no basis for believing that the Court intended to erase this wealth of
precedent.”).
341. Warner Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475 (prescribing an
adherence to the doctrine of equivalents based on an element-by-element analysis).
342. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
343. 185 F.3d 1341, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
344. See id. at 1349, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1562 (summarizing precedent for
allowing available alternatives not on the market to preclude lost profits damages).
345. See id. at 1350-51, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563 (surmising that, when faced
with the existence of a patent, a potential competitor prefers to find a lawful way to
remain in the market rather than leaving it altogether).
346. See id. (stating the requirement that a fair construction of a “but for” market
must take into account possible actions on the part of the infringer).
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produced and sold during the infringement [that] the court [can]
discern the market value of the patent owner’s exclusive right, and
therefore his expected profit or reward, had the infringer’s
activities not prevented him from taking full economic advantage
347
of this right.

The court noted that a noninfringing alternative available during
the entire infringement period must be available during the period
of infringement for which the patent owner seeks damages, also
known as the accounting period.348 A switch to a noninfringing
substitute after the accounting period does not prove availability of
the noninfringing substitute throughout the accounting period.349
Similarly, the court noted that an acceptable substitute is determined
by the opinion of consumers in the relevant market.350
2.

Attorney’s fees
A court may award to the winning side attorney’s fees, under 35
U.S.C. § 285, when the exceptional circumstances of a particular suit
favor such an award.351 District courts vary widely on what situations
rise to the level of exceptional circumstances.352 In Interlink Electronics
v. InControl Solutions, Inc., 353 the Federal Circuit found “exceptional”
circumstances for an award of attorney fees because the plaintiff
submitted altered reproductions of a figure 3 from the patent, so that
it would appear more similar to the accused device.354
In Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,355 the
Federal Circuit held that with regard to attorney’s fees, under 35
U.S.C. § 285, Federal Circuit precedent applies as opposed to that of
the regional circuit.356 The court held that courts must take into

347. Id. at 1351, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1563.
348. See id. at 1353, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565 (terming the accounting period
the “critical time period” when determining the availability of alternatives).
349. See id. (recommending caution to trial courts when determining the
availability of substitutes not sold during the period of infringement).
350. See id. at 1355, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (listing the facets of consumer
opinions responsible for determining the acceptability of substitutes).
351. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) (authorizing the award of attorney’s fees in
“exceptional” circumstances).
352. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1301, 1304 (citing various reasons for deeming a case exceptional
under 35 U.S.C. § 285).
353. No. 98-1567, 1999 WL 641230 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 1999) (per curiam)
(unpublished decision).
354. See id. at *3 (finding that District Court’s determination that party acted in
bad faith was sufficient to uphold designation of circumstances as exceptional).
355. 182 F.3d 1356, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
356. See id. at 1359, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468 (touting the uniqueness within
patent law that Federal Circuit law governs the substantive interpretation of 35 U.S.C.
§ 285).
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consideration findings of inequitable conduct,357 frivolous claims of
willful infringement, and refusal to adhere to collateral estoppel in
determining whether exceptional circumstances exist.358 The court
noted that these are not determinative to the award of attorney’s fees,
but should be addressed under the district court’s analysis.359
3.

Interest on damages
A court has the ability to award interest based on its finding of
damages. The Federal Circuit, in Transmatic, Inc. v. Gulton Industries,
Inc.,360 concluded that in determining the correct dividing line for
calculating pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, regional circuit
law applies.361 The court held that this issue extends outside of patent
law and is dominated by Supreme Court precedent interpreting 28
U.S.C. § 1961(a).362
B. Prosecution History Estoppel
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel precludes a patent
owner from making claims on subject matter that she gave up during
patent prosecution to avoid patentability rejections. In Princeton
Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,363 the Federal Circuit
refused to apply prosecution history estoppel to an unamended
claim.364 The court held that amending the parent claims of a final
claim that was returned to its unamended form in a continuation-inpart application does not trigger prosecution history estoppel.365 In
Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,366 the Federal
Circuit held that when an applicant identifies an element of a

357. See id. at 1359, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468 (recalling that Federal Circuit
precedent requires the consideration of inequitable conduct under 35 U.S.C. § 285).
358. See id. at 1361, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1469 (agreeing with respondent that
the district court properly considered opposition’s assertion of willful infringement
and resistance to estoppel when making “extraordinary” determination).
359. See id., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468 (refusing to hold that “improvident
allegation of willfulness or resistance to the imposition of collateral estoppel
automatically warrants an award of attorney fees”).
360. 180 F.3d 1342, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1591 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
361. See id. at 1347-48, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1593-94 (determining that having
the Federal Circuit fix the division between pre- and post-judgment would not
promote uniformity or certainty within the circuits).
362. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990)
(holding that post-verdict interest is calculated from the date of judgment entered
and at the rate in effect on the day of a court’s legally sufficient verdict).
363. No. 98-1525, 1999 WL 641233 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 1999) (unpublished
opinion).
364. See id. at *5 (finding that a claim’s return to unamended form counsels
against application of prosecution history estoppel).
365. See id.
366. 170 F.3d 1373, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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composition as critical, prosecution history estoppel prevents the
patent owner from going back and laying claim to any compositions
which do not include the critical element.367 Thus, emphasis on
criticality of an element creates a safe harbor for reasonable
competitors to take all other embodiments as unclaimed.368
CONCLUSION
Lately, Congress has been changing the playing field for patent
practice with a greater frequency. In the past, the Federal Circuit
provided the majority of the dynamic flux in patent law. The
American Inventors Protection Act has set into motion many new
concepts in U.S. patent law such as domestic publication, term
adjustment, and a variety of other mechanics affecting patent
prosecution.
The Federal Circuit will have to consider how these new formalities
affect patent practice and take them into consideration when ruling
on interpretations of patent law. It is important for the cohesion of
patent law that new concepts in patent law are integrated into the
existing law to establish a functional patent system, as opposed to
exclusively serving the goals of the political interests that lobbied to
enact these concepts. The Federal Circuit will play a key role in
making patent practice a manageable task within the new regime.

367. See id. at 1376, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036 (accepting respondent’s
argument that petitioner, through clear and convincing statements, relinquished
drug formulations and is barred from claiming infringement of competitor drugs
using these formulations).
368. See id. at 1379, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1038-39 (describing how the collateral
estoppel doctrine allows an accused infringer to take advantage of an
unenforceability decision made with respect to an unrelated accused infringer).

